Board structure has been linked to firm environment and characteristics, but the evidence is based on correlations rather than causal estimates. In particular, there is evidence of a positive correlation between board independence and financial leverage. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that the number and fraction of independent directors increases following a debt covenant violation, as creditors can use the threat of accelerating loan payments to demand a more independent board of directors. The effect is economically important as a covenant violation implies up to one additional independent director in the board. Our findings establish a causal effect from firm characteristics -leverage -to board structure through a transfer of control from shareholders to creditors. JEL Classification: G32; G34
Introduction
While previous research has shown that board structure and firm characteristics are related, it has been much less clear on how they are related and what are the channels and mechanisms behind these correlations. Thus, we know that firm characteristics and board structure are correlated but a causal effect has not been established yet. The goal of this paper is to study this issue by identifying a specific channel through which firm characteristics affect board structure.
The determinants of board structure can be classified into three broadly defined hypotheses: the scope of operations hypothesis, the monitoring hypothesis, and the negotiation hypothesis.
The scope of operations hypothesis suggests that the size and complexity of a firm's operations affect its board structure (Fama and Jensen (1983) ). As a firm grows and diversifies, it faces an increasing demand for specialized board members who can perform tasks such as auditing and setting managerial compensation. The monitoring hypothesis emphasizes the importance of a firm's business environment for the optimal design of its board structure (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , Raheja (2005) , and Adams and Ferreira (2007) ). The negotiation hypothesis emphasizes the role of the negotiation between the CEO and outside directors as an important determinant of board composition (Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) ).
Empirical evidence by Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja (2007) , Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008), and Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) finds elements of these theories to explain board size and independence. In particular, they find that board structure and capital structure are related.
The findings in these papers indicate that there is a positive and significant correlation between financial leverage and board independence and board size. They interpret this finding as indicating that firms with high leverage, which depend on external resources to a greater extent, could have greater advising requirements (Pfeffer (1972) and Klein (1998) ). Thus, leverage (and also diversification and firm size) are interpreted as proxies for complexity and the CEO's need for advice. These papers, however, do not show that the leverage-board structure link is robust to omitted variable concerns and endogeneity concerns. Moreover, they do not identify the channel through which debt impacts board structure.
To achieve this goal, we examine the impact of debt covenant violations on board structure.
Covenant violations are a natural experimental ground to investigate the influence of creditors on corporate boards. There are several reasons why financial covenant violations provide an excellent opportunity to study the influence of creditors on board structure. First, when a firm violates a covenant, control rights shift to creditors, who can use the threat of accelerating the loan payments to exert considerable influence over shareholders. Covenant violations provide creditors with the same rights as a payment default, including the ability to accelerate any outstanding principal and to terminate any unused revolving credit facility capacity. Although creditors almost always waive the violation, the threat associated with these rights enables creditors to exert considerable influence over managerial decision-making and shareholders.
Second, covenant violations are common, and their discrete nature enables us to employ a regression discontinuity design to address the concern that board structure and firm characteristics are jointly determined. The discrete nature of the covenant violation generates a potentially exogenous source of variation in the distance to the covenant threshold that can be used to estimate the effect of firm characteristics on board structure. Therefore, the goal of our empirical strategy is to show that shareholders would not have altered their board structure in the same manner had the covenant violation not occurred.
In this paper, we investigate the link between leverage and board structure and identify a specific mechanism through which leverage affects board structure. We extend previous empirical papers on board structure determinants by showing that the relation between board structure and leverage is robust in several ways. We show that there is a positive and significant relation between leverage and the number of independent directors, fraction of independent directors, and total number of directors in the boardroom. This relation is robust to a long list of possible covariates and after the inclusion of firm fixed effects, suggesting that time-invariant unobserved firm characteristics cannot explain our empirical findings.
We then empirically identify a specific channel (debt covenants) and mechanism (transfer of control rights from shareholders to debtholders) behind the link between leverage and board structure. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find a positive and significant relation between debt covenant violations and both the number and fraction of independent directors in the boardroom. The magnitude of the effect is economically important. We find that debt covenant violations imply that the number of independent directors in the boardroom increases by up to one director. This effect is significantly stronger than those found in previous studies of the determinants of board structure. Indeed, our research design allows us to pin down the direct effect of a change in firm characteristics on board structure.
Debt covenant violations are not similarly related to the total number of directors in the boardroom, which indicates that creditors use their influence to pressure for a more independent board but at the same time they do not increase board size. So there seems to occur a restructuring of the board of directors following a covenant violation with inside directors being replaced by independent directors. The interpretation is that creditors see an increase in the board's monitoring role as an important mechanism to maximize the chance that the firm repays its debt through future cash flows.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample and the data. Section 3 presents our evidence on the relation between board structure and leverage using panel regressions. In Section 4 we study the relation between debt covenant violations and board structure using a regression discontinuity empirical framework. Section 5 concludes.
Data and Methodology
We start with nonfinancial firms in the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database between 1990 and 2007. We obtain board data from Compact Disclosure for the 1990-1995 period and from IRCC for the 1996-2007 period. The governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) (GIM) is from IRRC and CEO compensation and tenure data are from ExecuComp. We obtain accounting and segment data from Compustat and stock returns from CRSP. This sample contains 2,554 firms and 19,603 firm-year observations. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in our study. Table A .1 in the Appendix presents a detailed definition of the variables. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 are comparable to those of other studies in the board of directors literature (e.g., Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011) ).
This sample is merged with covenant violations data obtained from Amir Sufi's website and from the Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation's (LPC) DealScan database. The dataset which we obtain from Amir Sufi´s website was prepared using information from the 10-Q and 10-K filings on the SEC Edgar website. 1 Using an algorithm described in Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2011), they identify financial covenant violations for a large number of publicly traded firms. They construct an indicator variable of whether or not the firm reports a violation of a financial covenant during the corresponding quarter. When using this dataset in Section 3 (Tables (2)-(4)), the sample period is restricted to the years between 1996 and 2007. 2 The database of covenant violations reported in SEC filings is compiled at quarterly frequency as opposed to board data which is annual. This is because changes in the composition of the board of directors typically occur no more than once a year after their approval at the annual shareholder meeting. This difference in data frequency requires having to convert the quarterly covenant violation indicator variable from this dataset into an annual covenant violation indicator variable. Specifically, we define a violating firm as one that violates a covenant in at least one quarter at a given year. The sample that results from merging the covenant violation data with our initial sample contains 2,264 firms and 12,173 firm-year observations. From this sample, we calculate that 23% of the firms violate a covenant at least once during the sample period (526 firms), and 7% of the firm-year observations correspond to a covenant violation event (896 firm-year observations).
As a robustness test, we provide additional results in Section 4 (Tables (6)-(7)) using debt covenant information extracted from DealScan for the 1996-2007 period. The DealScan database contains information on syndicated loans made by banks to typically large firms around the world. It provides information about loan amounts, maturity, type of loan, syndication, covenants, pricing, among others. We eliminate all the firms for which we do not have any loan with information on covenants or which are not bound by either a current ratio, a net worth, tangible net worth or a debt-to-EBITDA ratio covenant at least once during our sample period. 3 We 2 This corresponds to the first dataset compiled by Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2011) . It also covers the first quarter of 2008 which we do not consider given that the frequency of our remaining data is annual.
3 Chava and Roberts (2008) focus on covenants involving the current ratio and the (tangible) net worth. Demiroglu and James (2010) on those involving the current ratio and the debt-to-EBITDA ratio. These seem to be covenants merge these sample of loans to our initial sample using company name and loan origination date. This is the sample we use to identify whether a firm violates any of the covenants or how far away it is from violation.
The covenant variable from DealScan gives a covenant threshold which we compare to the corresponding accounting variable calculated for a given point in time during the lifetime of the loan. If the accounting variable exceeds the covenant threshold there is no covenant violation; if it does not exceed (or is equal to) the covenant threshold there is a covenant violation. We apply this decision rule to three out of the four covenants that we consider. For the case of the debt-to-EBITDA, the accounting ratio should not exceed the covenant threshold for a non-violating firm.
Specifically, we take each of the previous loans with covenant information and consider that the firm is bound by this covenant (or covenants) at every quarter until the loan maturity date. We follow Chava and Roberts (2008) and choose to use quarterly frequency in this part of the analysis. This is because most borrowers report their financial statements to creditors every quarter to be monitored on the compliance with the covenant requirements. We use Compustat data at quarterly frequency to compute the relevant accounting variables. When we compare the covenant threshold to the value of the corresponding accounting we are effectively calculating a measure of distance to default at a given quarter. Since a firm might have more than one active loan at a given quarter, we calculate distance to default using the minimum covenant threshold (maximum for the debt-to-EBITDA ratio) at a given quarter. Since these values are measured at a quarterly basis we characterize the behavior of the firm at a given year by calculating the minimum value across the four covenants within one year. This sample contains 613 firms and which appear frequently in loan contracts in general (e.g., Chava and Roberts (2008) and Dichev and Skinner (2002) ). 1,879 firm-year observations. From this sample, we calculate that 17% of the firms violate a covenant at least once during the sample period (103 firms), and 14% of the firm-year observations correspond to a covenant violation event (260 firm-year observations).
Board Structure, Leverage and Covenant Violations
In this section, we study the relation between leverage, debt covenant violations and board structure using OLS and firm fixed effects panel regressions. We consider three measures of board structure: number of independent directors, board independence and board size. The explanatory variables of interest are financial leverage and debt covenant violations.
We first examine the relation between debt covenant violations and board structure using graphical analysis. We first show the means of our three board structure variables for violators from two years before the violation through two years after the violation focusing on firm-years observations that fall within a narrow range (± 0.3) around the covenant threshold obtained from the DealScan database.
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the evolution of the number of independent directors around a violation. The number of independent directors is nearly constant during the two years before the violation. However, when the covenant violation occurs at year 0 the number of independent directors increases and keeps increasing in the years following the violation (between 0 and +2). Figure 1 shows a similar pattern for the number of directors as a fraction of board size.
Panel B of
In contrast, there is no evidence of a change in board size when the violation occurs at year 0. Figure 2 shows similar results when we look at the means of our three board structure variables focusing on the distance to the covenant threshold itself. Table 2 presents the outcome of ordinary least squares (OLS) and firm fixed effects panel regressions, where the dependent variable is the number of independent directors. Our explanatory variable of interest is book leverage, which is defined as the ratio of total debt (i.e., long term debt and debt in current liabilities) to total assets. Later we will consider alternative definitions of leverage. All explanatory variables, including leverage, are measured with a twoyear lag relative to board structure variables since the effect of firm characteristics on board structure is likely to take time to happen. OLS regressions include industry (two-digit SIC) and
Number of Independent Directors
year fixed effects. All reported t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation using clustered standard errors.
Column (1) presents the coefficients of an OLS regression of the number of independent directors on leverage and other variables that have been shown to be correlated with board structure. There is strong evidence of a positive and statistically significant relation between the number of independent directors and leverage. The leverage coefficient is 1.15 with a t-statistic of 4.12. The effect of leverage on the number of independent directors is economically significant if compared with the effects of other important board structure determinants. Using the specification in column (1), a one standard deviation increase in leverage increases the number of independent directors by roughly 0.26 directors.
With respect to the other explanatory variables, we find that firm size, firm age and the number of business segments are all positively and significantly related to board independence.
These findings are consistent with the scope of the operations hypothesis that more complex firms require more independent boards. Consistent with the monitoring hypothesis, we find a statistically negative relation between the number of independent directors and the market-tobook ratio and stock return volatility.
Endogeneity problems are a crucial concern in empirical research on corporate governance.
In our setting, there could be many reasons for board structure and leverage to be jointly determined. We first address the potential endogeneity problems using firm fixed effects methods that control for unobserved sources of firm heterogeneity. Fixed effects methods solve joint determination problems in which an unobserved time-invariant variable simultaneously determines both leverage and board structure. It is also equivalent to looking only at within-firm changes in leverage.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 present firm fixed effects estimates, as well as year fixed effects and t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering. There is still evidence of a positive relation between the number of independent directors and leverage. In Column (2), the estimate of the leverage coefficient is 0.68 with a significant t-statistic of 2.75. Column (3) presents estimates for a specification that includes additional explanatory variables which are the governance index (GIM) and CEO ownership and tenure. The estimate and t-statistics of the leverage coefficient remain very similar to those in column (2). Moreover, the governance index (GIM) coefficient is positive and statistically significant, which is consistent with the idea that the number of independent directors is higher in firms that are insulated from the market for corporate control (Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2006) ). The coefficient of CEO ownership is negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with the suggestion of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) that board structure is influenced by the negotiations between CEOs and outside directors. The evidence indicates that the presence of independent directors is negatively related to the degree of CEO influence.
The fixed effects results go a long way toward dismissing omitted variables explanations as sources of endogeneity. Because only the effects of within-firm changes in board structure are taken into account, firm-specific omitted variables cannot explain the observed relation between leverage and the number of independent directors. Firm fixed effects estimates, however, do not address reverse causality concerns, i.e., that changes in board structure could affect leverage. In the analysis that follows and in the next section, we will use financial covenants violations and a regression discontinuity design to establish a casual effect from leverage to board structure. In particular, we will establish a link between leverage and the presence of independent directors in the boardroom.
We start by examining the effect of debt covenant violations on the number of independent directors in the boardroom. Column (4) of Table 2 presents estimation results where we add the covenant violation dummy as reported in the SEC filings as an explanatory variable to the specification in column (3). The results show that the number of independent directors increases following the covenant violation. The covenant violation dummy coefficient is 0.2, with a tstatistic of 2.53. The coefficient on leverage is still positive and significant in column (4).
The model reported in column (5) adds the covenant control variables: debt to assets ratio, return on assets, interest expenses to assets ratio, net worth to assets ratio, and cash to assets ratio.
The choice of these controls is based on the most common financial covenants employed in private credit agreements. The covenant violation dummy coefficient is 0.18, with a t-statistic of 2.36, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the leverage coefficient is no longer statistically significant. This is a first indication that covenant violations is the channel by which leverage impacts board structure.
To disentangle the effect of the covenant violation from changes in board structure that would have otherwise occurred, we estimate the impact of the covenant violation by focusing only on discontinuous changes in board structure occurring at the covenant threshold. We apply this discontinuity approach by including as right-hand side variables a covenant violation indicator variable along with linear, nonlinear, and step functions of the underlying variables on which covenants are written. With the inclusion of these functions, the point estimate on the covenant violation indicator variable is identified under the assumption that shareholder preferences over board structure are not discontinuous exactly at the covenant threshold. This assumption is valid as long as shareholders, in the absence of financial covenants, would not have chosen the exact same ratios and levels of the ratios as creditors to determine financial policy. This "quasi-discontinuity" approach is similar to the one in Roberts and Sufi (2009) .
In this way, columns (6)-(7) present additional specifications of the number of independent directors regression. The specification reported in column (6) includes the covenant control variables and high-order polynomial terms (squared and cubic) for each of the covenant control variables. Finally, column (7) includes the covenant control variables, high-order polynomial terms (squared and cubic) for each of the covenant control variables, and quintile indicator variables for each of the covenant control variables. Even with this extensive set of covenant control variables, the covenant violation dummy coefficient is largely unaffected, remaining at 0.2 with a t-statistic of 2.51. The leverage coefficients is also insignificant in these specifications.
Board Independence
The number of independent directors could be higher because the board includes more directors.
We next examine the relation between leverage and board independence, i.e., the number of independent directors as a fraction of board size. Table 3 presents the outcome of OLS and firm fixed effects panel regressions, where the dependent variable y is a logistic transformation (or the log odds ratio) of the fraction of independent directors z (i.e., y = ln(z/(1-z)). We use a logistic transformation because the fraction of independent directors is bounded between zero and one.
The models in Table 3 are similar to those in Table 2 .
We obtain similar evidence using board independence as a dependent variable to that using the number of independent directors. Column (1) presents OLS estimates and columns (2) and (3) firm fixed effects estimates. There is evidence of a positive and statistically significant relation between board independence and leverage. In column (1), the estimate of the leverage coefficient is 0.34 with a significant t-statistic of 3.09. The effect of leverage on board independence is economically significant if compared with the effects of other important board structure determinants.
With respect to the other explanatory variables, the OLS estimates are in general consistent with the scope of the operations and the monitoring hypotheses. However, the evidence in favor of these hypotheses is significantly weaker when using firm fixed effects.
Columns (4)-(7) present the outcome of firm fixed effects panel regression models, where the dependent variable is the number of independent directors as a fraction of board size. In these models we include both the covenant violation dummy and leverage as explanatory variables.
These models are similar to those in Table 2 . In all models, we find a positive and significant relation between board independence and the covenant violation dummy. For example, even with an extensive set of covenant control variables as in column (7), the covenant violation dummy coefficient is largely unaffected, remaining at 0.08 with a t-statistic of 2.33. Furthermore, we find that the leverage coefficient is in most cases no longer statistically significant when we add the covenant violation dummy as a explanatory variable. Table 4 presents the outcome of OLS and firm fixed effects panel regressions, where the dependent variable is board size. The models in Table 4 are similar to those in Tables 2 and 3 .
Board Size
Column (1) presents OLS estimates and columns (2)-(7) firm fixed effects estimates.
Columns (1) and (3) show evidence of a positive and statistically significant relation between board size and leverage. In column (1), the leverage coefficient is 1.02, with a t-statistic of 3.74.
The firm fixed effects estimates are significantly different. In column (3), there is still a positive relation between board size and leverage but statistically significant only at the 10% level.
With respect to the other explanatory variables, we find that firm size and firm age are positively and significantly related to board size. These findings are consistent with the scope of the operations hypothesis that more complex firms require more directors. Consistent with the monitoring hypothesis, we find a statistically negative relation between board size and marketto-book ratio and stock return volatility. The governance index coefficient is positive and statistically significant, which is consistent with the idea that the number of directors is higher in firms that are insulated from the market for corporate control. The coefficient of CEO ownership is negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with the hypothesis that board structure is influenced by the negotiations between CEOs and outside directors.
Columns (4)-(7) present the outcome of firm fixed effects panel regression models, where the dependent variable is the number of directors. In these models we include both the covenant violation dummy and leverage as explanatory variables. These models are similar to those in Table 2 . In all models, we find an insignificant relation between board size and the covenant violation dummy.
Overall, the evidence in Tables 2-4 show a positive and significant relation between the presence of independent directors in the boardroom and leverage. Highly levered firms seem to have both a higher number of independent directors and a higher fraction of independent directors. This finding is not explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity. In contrast, leverage is not reliably associated with larger boards. These findings are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) and Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008)) that also find that leverage is positively associated with leverage. They interpret these findings as suggesting that firms with high leverage depend on external resources to a greater extent and could have greater advising requirements. Therefore, board size and independence increase in firm complexity and advising benefits. Our findings in this section extend previous studies by showing that the relation between leverage and board independence is robust to omitted variable concerns by using a firm fixed effects estimator. This empirical fact is important as other determinants of board independence are not significantly related to board independence when we use a firm fixed effects estimator.
Our findings in this section also support a causal effect of leverage on board structure and provide evidence of the channel by which this effect occurs. We find that that the number and fraction of independent directors increases following a debt covenant violation. In contrast, there is no evidence that board size increases following a violation. Taken together these findings support the idea that following a covenant violation there are important changes in a firm's board structure as there is a transfer of control rights from shareholders to creditors. Creditors can advise the firm on how best to "manage through" the violation to maximize the chance that the firm repays its debt through future cash flows. We present evidence that one of those actions taken by creditors is to increase the presence of independent directors in the board and therefore improve board monitoring. These changes do not seem to take place by increasing the number of directors, but by replacing inside directors by independent directors.
Alternative Leverage Measures
In this section we further investigate the relation between board structure and leverage. We have defined leverage as the ratio of total debt to total assets-book leverage. We now investigate the relation between board structure variables and alternative measures of leverage.
If leverage affects board structure because of the transfer of control rights to debtholders due to covenant violations or default then book leverage is an appropriate measure of leverage as covenants are typically written on ratios calculated using book values. On the other hand, market leverage captures the market perception of the financial health of the firm and incorporates all available information about firm's future prospects. It may be the case that the optimal board structure changes by other reasons than violations and therefore market leverage could be a better proxy. If the channel by which leverage affects board structure is not only the transfer of control to creditors, then we should also expect market leverage to be positively related to board structure.
Columns (1) The main explanatory variables of interest are the ratio of total debt to the market value of assets, which is defined as total debt plus market value of equity, and the covenant violation dummy.
There is no significant relation between the board structure variables and market leverage and the covenant violation dummy results are fully consistent with the book leverage results. This is consistent with the fact that covenant violations and "technical default" seem to be an important channel by which debt affects board structure.
We next use long term debt over total assets as a measure of leverage, in alternative to considering total debt (i.e., long term debt and debt in current liabilities). Debt covenants are typically written on total debt to assets ratios rather than long term debt. Thus, if indeed covenant violations is an important mechanism by which leverage affects board structure, total debt seems to be a more appropriate measure and we should find stronger results using total debt than using long term debt.
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 5 present estimates of firm fixed effect regressions, where the dependent variable is the number of independent directors, board independence and board size.
The main explanatory variables of interest are long-term debt to total assets and the covenant violation dummy. We find similar results to the market and book leverage cases.
Discontinuity Regressions
In this section, we use DealScan information to isolate the analysis to a sample of loans for which we know the covenant thresholds. Such an analysis alleviates two potential concerns associated with the results in the previous section: (1) the exact covenant threshold for which the violation occurs is unknown; and (2) we observe only reported covenant violations. The analysis and sample are similar to those found in Chava and Roberts (2008) .
In Table ( 6), we estimate firm fixed effects panel regressions of the number of independent directors, board independence and board size. All explanatory variables are lagged two periods.
All regressions include year fixed effects and t-statistics are adjusted for firm-level clustering.
The explanatory variable of interest is the covenant violation dummy, whose coefficient represents the impact of a covenant violation of board structure. Because of the inclusion of a firm-fixed effect, identification of the coefficient of interest comes only from those firms that experience a covenant violation. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the subsample of firms that experience at least one covenant violation; however, the estimated treatment effect using the entire sample of firms is qualitatively similar.
Moreover, because of the measurement problems associated with determining distance to default and because loan agreements contain adjustments to the covenant level over the life of the loan, we might misclassify or miss some violations using the covenant threshold at the origination date. This is not a concern if we examine the covenant violations that are reported in the borrower's financial statements for which we can identify a loan agreement and respective covenant thresholds in DealScan. As Beneish and Press (1993) explain, violations reported in the borrower's financial statements are likely to be more serious violations that have not been cured or waived at the time the financials were prepared. For these reasons, we start by using reported violations in SEC filings as our main explanatory variable as in Demiroglu and James (2010).
We then check the robustness of our findings using violations identified based only on the covenant slack relative to the covenant threshold obtained from DealScan, without using the information reported to the SEC. Table 6 presents the estimation results for the entire sample consisting of loans containing either a current ratio, debt-to-EBITDA, or net worth-to-assets ratio covenant.
Panel A of
Columns (1), (4) and (7) of Table 6 present estimation results with only the covenant violation dummy as an explanatory variable. Columns (1) and (4) show that covenant violations are associated with an increase in the number of independent director and board independence. The coefficient of the covenant violation dummy is 0.46 in the number of independent directors regression, with a t-statistic of 1.90. The coefficient of the covenant violation dummy is 0.24 in the board independence regression, with a t-statistic of 2.20. Column (7) shows that covenant violations do not seem to have a significant effect on board size. These findings are consistent with those from the "quasi-discontinuity" regression approach in the previous section.
Columns (2)-(3), (5)-(6), and (8)-(9) include the set of control variables used in Tables 2-4 and smooth functions of order five of the distance from the default boundary defined in terms of current ratio, debt-to-EBITDA or net worth-to-assets ratio. The goal of including these functions is to isolate the treatment effect to the point of discontinuity and to address the concern that the distance to the covenant threshold contains information about board structure not captured by the other determinants. With this extensive set of controls, the covenant violation dummy coefficient is even stronger in the number of directors and board independence regressions. The coefficient of the covenant violation dummy is 0.58 (t-statistic is 2.42) in the number of independent directors regression in column (3), and 0.27 (t-statistic is 2.48) in the board independence regression in column (6). Table 6 presents the estimation results using the discontinuity sample. This sample contains only those firm-years observations that fall within a narrow range (± 0.3) around the covenant threshold. The results in this table confirm the findings obtained with the entire sample that both the number of independent directors and board independence increases significantly following a covenant violation. The magnitude of the effects is stronger using the discontinuity sample. We estimate that the number of independent directors in the boardroom increases between 1 and 1.3 directors following a covenant violation. The results in this panel of Table 6 also show evidence that board size significantly increases in response to covenant violations. The effects of covenant violations on the number of independent directors and board independence are consistent with our previous estimates, while the effect on board size is not.
Panel B of
In panel A and B of Tables 7, we follow a similar exercise focusing on the violations that we can identify using DealScan information alone. The results remain consistent with our main findings.
In sum, board structure changes significantly in response to covenant violations. The results indicate that the presence of independent directors increases significantly following covenant violations. These findings suggest that covenant violations impact board structure via the transfer of control rights from shareholders to debtholders. Moreover, these findings establish a channel that explain the link between board structure and leverage.
Conclusion
We investigate the link between leverage and board structure and identify a specific mechanism through which leverage affect board structure. We empirically identify a specific channel (debt covenants) and mechanism (transfer of control rights from shareholders to debtholders) behind the link between leverage and board structure. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find a positive and significant relation between debt covenant violations and both the number and fraction of independent directors in the boardroom. The magnitude of the effect is economically important. We find that debt covenant violations imply that the number of independent directors in the boardroom increases by more than one director.
Debt covenant violations are not similarly related to the total number of directors in the boardroom, which indicates that creditors use their influence to pressure for a more independent board but at the same time they do not increase board size. The interpretation is that debtholders see an increase in the board's monitoring role as an important mechanism to maximize the chance that the firm repays its debt through future cash flows. 
Table 2 Regression of Number of Independent Directors, Leverage and Covenant Violations
Estimates of OLS and firm fixed effects panel regressions of the number of independent board directors are shown. Covenant controls are debt to assets, return on assets, interest expenses to assets, net worth to assets, and cash to assets. Specifications include covenant controls raised to the second and third power and covenant controls quintile indicators. All regressions include year fixed effects. Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. The sample consists of observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center firms from 1990 to 2007. Financial industries are omitted (SIC codes 6000-6999). Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 3 Regression of Board Independence, Leverage and Covenant Violations
Estimates of OLS and firm fixed effects panel regressions of the logistic transformed fraction of independent board directors are shown. Covenant controls are debt to assets, return on assets, interest expenses to assets, net worth to assets, and cash to assets. Specifications include covenant controls raised to the second and third power and covenant controls quintile indicators. All regressions include year fixed effects. Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. The sample consists of observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center firms from 1990 to 2007. Financial industries are omitted (SIC codes 6000-6999). Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Table 4 Regression of Board Size, Leverage and Covenant Violations
Estimates of OLS and firm fixed effects panel regressions of the number of board directors are shown. Covenant controls are debt to assets, return on assets, interest expenses to assets, net worth to assets, and cash to assets. Specifications include covenant controls raised to the second and third power and covenant controls quintile indicators. All regressions include year fixed effects. Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. The sample consists of observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center firms from 1990 to 2007. Financial industries are omitted (SIC codes 6000-6999). Robust t-tatistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Table 5 Regression of Board Structure and Alternative Leverage Measures
Estimates of firm fixed effects panel regressions of the number of independent board directors, logistic transformed fraction of independent board directors, and number of board directors are shown. All regressions include year fixed effects. Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. The sample consists of observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center firms from 1990 to 2007. Financial industries are omitted (SIC codes 6000-6999). Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
(2) (3) (4) (5) Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. The sample consists of observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center firms that are included in the DealScan database with a loan containing covenants restricting its current ratio, net worth or debt-to-EBITDA ratio to lie above or below a certain threshold. The discontinuity sample is defined as those firm-year observations in which the absolute value of the relative distance to the covenant threshold is less than 0.30. The sample period is from 1990 to 2007. Financial industries are omitted (SIC codes 6000-6999). Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Estimates of OLS regressions of the number of independent board directors, logistic transformed fraction of independent board directors, and number of board directors are shown. All regressions include year fixed effects. In Panel A regressions include a polynomial function of order five of the distance from the default boundary. Refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for variable definitions. The sample consists of observations on Investor Responsibility Research Center firms that are included in the DealScan database with a loan containing covenants restricting its current ratio, net worth or debt-to-EBITDA ratio to lie above or below a certain threshold. The discontinuity sample is defined as those firm-year observations in which the absolute value of the relative distance to the covenant threshold is less than 0.30. The sample period is from 1990 to 2007. Financial industries are omitted (SIC codes 6000-6999). Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels..
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Covenant violation dummy -Dealscan 0.36*** 0.25*** 0.20** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.25** 0. 
